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Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis:
Parents' Right to a "Perfect" Child?
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in man's knowledge of human genetics, the ever-widening dis-
semination of the biomedical skills necessary for applying that knowledge,
and a perceived desirability of putting those skills to use have combined to
create a new' biomedical professional role-the genetic counselor.2 In
general, a genetic counselor is a person concerned with predicting and diag-
nosing the occurrence of genetic disorders and making evaluations that are
helpful to his client. In this emerging era of planned parenthood, when
couples seek to exercise control over many aspects of human reproduction,
information concerning the genetic endowment of their children can have a
momentous effect on the decision to procreate. When a risk of genetic
impairment or an undesirable gene-related characteristic is made known
before conception or during pregnancy, a couple may choose to avert the
birth of a child through contraception or eugenic abortion.4
As a developing area of clinical practice that has far-reaching conse-
quences for the lives it touches, it was inevitable that genetic counseling
would become a source of conflict requiring legal scrutiny. The most troubling
problem to be raised in the courts is whether a medical practitioner may be
liable if his conduct leads to the birth of a child afflicted with genetic disorder
when the presence of that disorder might have been diagnosed through the use
of prenatal diagnostic techniques. The New York Court of Appeals and the
New Jersey Supreme Court recently became the first state courts of final
jurisdiction to consider this question In Becker v. Schwartz,6 the New York
I. The term 'genetic counseling" has a history dating back to the early 1900s, when this country wit-
nessed its first popular eugenics movement, heralded by self-proclaimed social reformers. Sorenson, From
Social Movement to Clinical Medicine-The Role of Law and the Medical Profession in Regulating Applied
Human Genetics in GENETICS AND THE LAW 467, 471-77 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976). It is only in
recent years, however, that medicine has shown receptivity to genetics and genetic counseling as a basis for
prevention of disease. Id. at 475-76.
2. See generally Leonard, Chase & Childs, Genetic Counseling: A Consumer's View, 287 NEW ENGLAND
J. MED. 433 (1972).
3. See Hall, The Concerns of Doctors and Patients, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS 23 (B.
Hilton et al. eds. 1973).
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1%5). Since techniques
for artifically altering human genotypes ("genetic engineering") are still largely theoretical, prevention con-
tinues to be the emphasized medical approach to genetic disease. See P. REILLY, GENETICS AND SOCIAL
POLICY 22-26 (1977).
5. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421. 404 A.2d 8 (1979). See also Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978)(child born with Tay-Sachs disease after parents were allegedly told that amniocentesis was negative); Park
v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), modified, 60 A.D.2d 80,400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977),
modified sub nomn. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (child born
with polycystic kidney disease after physician allegedly assured the parents that disease was not hereditary);
Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 A.D.2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1975) (mem.) (child with impairments born after failure to
offer amniocentesis).
6. 46 N.Y..2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
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court permitted parents to recover the expenses of caring for a child born with
a genetic impairment, but held that emotional distress caused by the birth was
not compensable. Conversely, the New Jersey court in Berman v. Allan
7
permitted parents of a genetically impaired child to sue for damages for
emotional distress, but denied recovery for any expenses related to raising the
child. Both courts refused to recognize claims brought on behalf of the child
for "wrongful life."
Public comment on these decisions has ranged from acclaim8 to conster-
nation.9 One court has expressed the opinion that recognition of this new tort
will impose an absolute duty upon obstetricians to provide comprehensive
genetic services-in effect, compelling them to assume the role of genetic
counselor by operation of law.'0 While that may be an overstatement, there is
reason for concern among medical practitioners. One almost certain result of
this new potential liability is that many practitioners will be forced to incor-
porate into their everyday practice a body of biomedical skills with which
they are unfamiliar, and which some may feel is foreign to the proper goals of
medicine.
To the extent Becker and Berman recognize that parents have a right to
determine the biological characteristics of their offspring, or (from a slightly
different perspective) to avoid the hardships involved in raising an abnormal
child, the decisions also raise serious questions of social policy. The law of
negligence functions as a means of social engineering. " From this perspective,
it is important to consider the directions that the law takes, not only in relation
to the technical and theoretical constructions familiar to students of law,' 2 but
also in relation to the social values by which all law must ultimately be judged.
This Comment examines the Becker and Berman cases in light of the
historical development of genetic counseling and previous cases involving
claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life. With the goal of suggesting just
and workable limitations on liability, the Comment then explores two impor-
tant aspects of the new cause of action recognized by the New York and New
Jersey courts: the standard of care imposed upon a physician or other profes-
sional who is in a position to provide prenatal diagnostic services, and the
issue of damages as it relates to the parents' claims. Finally, the Comment
presents the writer's reservations concerning the judicial recognition of this
cause of action. In view of the far-reaching effects upon health care that
imposition of liability will produce, the patently subjective valuations of
"defective" human life that lie unexpressed at the heart of these decisions,
7. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
8. Lavine, Wrongful Birth Decision Termed Victory for Patients, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 1979, at 3, col. I.
9. Doctors Held Liable in Abnormal Births, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1978, § B, at 6, col. 4 (suggesting that
some physicians will give up their obstetrics practice as a result of the Becker decision).
10. Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 424, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (1976).
11. Pound, Theory of Social Interests, 15 PUB. AM. SOC. SOCIETY 16 (1920).
12. See, e.g., Note, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim Which Conforms to the Traditional Tort Framework.
20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 125 (1979).
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and the sensitive questions of public policy involved, the Comment urges that
recognition of this tort should be left to legislative bodies.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Expanding Role of Genetics in Medical Practice
Until very recently, prenatal diagnosis and genetic counseling were
scarce commodities in the market of biomedical services offered to the public.
While large-scale genetic screening programs for the detection of a few treat-
able genetic disorders were being developed in the early 1960s, 3 individu-
alized genetic services were still offered by only a small number of specialists
affiliated with large university research centers and medical schools. ' 4
Traditionally, prospective parents concerned with the possible occur-
rence of a hereditary disorder have actively sought advice in two situations.
The most common is when a couple have previously given birth to a child with
a congenital anomaly and want to know the chances of recurrence. The
second situation arises when a couple are considering marriage or pregnancy
for the first time and are aware that one or both of them may be carriers of a
deleterious genetic trait because of some prior manifestation of a disorder,
perhaps among blood relatives. 5 Until about a decade ago, methods of detect-
ing and predicting the occurrence of such traits were often inexact.'
6
Today, new developments in genetic knowledge and technology have
created the potential for more comprehensive application of genetics in the
clinical setting. With information gained through analysis of accumulated
statistical data, the frequency of genetic disorders can often be correlated
13. The first large scale screening efforts came in response to the development of a test to detect
phenylketonuria (PKU), a metabolic disorder causing mental retardation that can be controlled by restricting the
infant's diet. Almost all states today have mandatory PKU screening laws for newborns. Reilly, State-Sup-
ported Mass Genetic Screening Programs, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 159, 159-60 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas
eds. 1976).
14. Sorenson, Sociological and Psychological Factors in Applied Human Genetics, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
HUMAN GENETICS 283, 290-93 (B. Hilton et al. eds. 1973).
15. Id. at 287-90.
16. The sum of every person's physical characteristics (phenotype) is determined in part by his unique
genetic makeup (genotype). Thousands of deleterious genetic disorders have been catalogued. Transmission of
genetic traits can be most easily predicted for single-gene (Mendelian) traits which exhibit simple patterns of
inheritance (e.g., hemophilia, sickle-cell anemia, and Tay-Sachs disease). Sometimes, a single-gene defect may
arise by mutation spontaneously in the parents gamete cells (sperm and ova). Accurate prediction of the
transmission of such genes may be very difficult. Erbe, Mass Screening and Genetic Counseling in Mendelian
Disorders, in ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF SCREENING FOR HUMAN GENETIC DISEASE
85 (D. Bergsma ed. 1974).
Polygenic (multifactorial) disorders are caused by the interaction of two or more genes (e.g., diabetes
mellitus, anencephaly, spina bifida). Prediction of the transmission of polygenic disorders is often inexact.
Ehrman & Lappd, Screening for Palygenic Disorders, in ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF
SCREENING FOR HUMAN GENETIC DISEASE 101 (D. Bergsma ed. 1974).
Some disorders result from gross chromosomal anomalies or the presence of an extra chromosome. Certain
disorders of this kind, such as Down's syndrome (mongolism), are known to occur more often with increased
maternal age; among women between the ages of 40 and 45 years, the incidence of bearing a child with Down's
syndrome is between I and 2 percent. C. STERN, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN GENETICS 112 (3d ed. 1973); Carter,
Practical Aspects of Early Diagnosis, in EARLY DIAGNOSIS OF HUMAN GENETIC DEFECTS 17, 19 (M. Harris
ed. 1970).
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with risk factors. 17 In addition, the growing arsenal of biochemical and
cytogenetic screening tests have made it easier to discover carriers of certain
unexpressed recessive genes. These capabilities make it possible in many
instances to predict significant reproductive risks before any sign of genetic im-
pairment has become apparent. Perhaps most important, however, has been
the development of prenatal diagnostic techniques such as amniocentesis,' 8
fetoscopy,' 9 and ultrasonography, ° which allow the detection of many genetic
anomalies in utero.2'
Genetic counseling, a field still in its infancy, notably lacks a system of
professional norms commonly found in other disciplines. In the absence of
licensure or certification requirements, 2 it may be practiced by physicians
and nonmedically trained professionals alike.Y Most formal genetic counsel-
ing takes place in regional centers employing a team approach,24 which may
bring a client together with an assortment of people with diversified training,
including physicians, nurses, Ph.D's, and Masters level associates. Combined
with the programs offered by many public health agencies,2 these form a
growing network of professional personnel devoted to advising women or
couples about the risks of transmitting inheritable disorders, and detecting
genetically impaired fetuses so that a woman carrying an affected fetus can
abort.
The use of technology for prenatal diagnosis of genetic disorders has not,
however, been welcomed universally by medical practitioners. Some physi-
cians see the preventive medicine approach to genetic disease as a repudiation
of the idea that the physician is the preserver of life. Thus, one physician has
asked:
When a child with Tay-Sachs disease is aborted, is that "therapy" for the aborted
child?... The "new" emphasis on prevention of disease of genetic origin is on
17. See McKusick, The Growth and Development of Human Genetics as a Clinical Discipline. 27 AM. J.
HUMAN GENETICS 261 (1975).
18. This procedure involves inserting a needle into the amniotic sac and withdrawing a sample ofamniotic
fluid; fetal cells contained in the fluid are then cultured so that further tests can be performed. A. MILUNSKY,
THE PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS OF HEREDITARY DISORDERS 3-4 (1973).
19. Fetoscopy is a variation of the amniocentesis procedure, with the addition of an optical system to
permit visualization of the fetus within the amniotic sac. It can also be used to take samples of the fetal blood.
allowing detection of genetically related hemoglobinopathies such as sickle cell anemia. See Mahoney &
Hobbins, Fetoscopy and Fetal Biopsy, in GENETICS COUNSELING 495 (H. Lubs & F. de la Cruz eds. 1977).
20. Ultrasound produces an image of the fetus which may be useful in determining the position and size of
the fetus. Certain polygenic neural tube defects can be detected by this technique. Unlike amniocentesis and
fetoscopy, ultrasonography appears to carry negligible risks of harming the fetus. See A. MILUNSKY, THE
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS OF HEREDITARY DISORDERS 137-38 (1973).
21. Id.
22. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 622 (1979).
23. Id.; Sorenson, From Social Movement to Clinical Medicine-The Role of Law and the Medical Profes-
sion in Regulating Applied Human Genetics, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 467, 478 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas
eds. 1976).
24. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 621 n.12 (1979).
25. See generally Reilly, State-Supported Mass Genetic Screening Programs, in GENETICS AND THE LAW
159 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976).
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the prevention of the existence of persons who might have the potential for dis-
ease. To prevent disease in this context means preventing people.
2 6
Even aside from the question whether abortion is an acceptable treat-
ment for genetic disorders, practitioners may hesitate to employ or advise
prenatal diagnosis when they believe that the risks accompanying the proce-
dure outweigh the probable beneficial results. For example, the incidence of
bearing a child with a chromosomal anomaly for women 35 to 39 years of age
who are not otherwise known to be at special risk has been placed in one
national study at approximately 1.5 percent. 27 At the same time, it is known
that anmiocentesis carries a risk of causing spontaneous abortion that has
been estimated to be from 1 to 2 percent. 28 The dilemma that this situation can
produce for a physician is obvious. Does a woman's interest in avoiding the
birth of a child with a chromosomal anomaly justify the use of amniocentesis
in a case in which the chances of inadvertently killing a normal fetus are equal
to or greater than the probability of detecting an affected one? Inherent in
many genetic counseling situations is an unsettling conflict of interest
between the fetus and its mother. To the extent that a physician's role has
changed from protector of prenatal life to implementer of the woman's will,
his legal duty toward the fetus has become blurred, 29 and perhaps irrelevant.
Yet, the ethical implications of prenatal diagnosis may in many instances
prove intolerable for a conscientious physician.
B. A Brief History of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
A cause of action arising from the birth of a genetically impaired child
requires consideration of certain issues also considered in suits brought by
parents for the birth of a healthy but unwanted child. That type of suit com-
monly has been based on allegations that the defendant was negligent in
performing a sterilization procedure, 0 dispensing oral contraceptives,31 per-
26. Murray, The Practitioner's View of the Values Involved in Genetic Screening and Counseling, in
ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF SCREENING FOR HUMAN GENETIC DISEASE 185, 193, 196
(D. Bergsma ed. 1974).
27. A. MILUNSKY, THE PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS OF HEREDITARY DISORDERS 24 (1973).
28. Medical Research Council Working Party on Amniocentesis, An Assessment of the Hazards of
Amniocentesis, 85 BRIT. J. OBSTET. GYNAEC. 1, 3 (Supp. 2 1978). See also Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic
Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 671 n.222 (1979). In addition to possible damage to the fetus, which may
include amnionitis, abruptio placenta, hemorrhage, and puncture of the fetus, amniocentesis carries small risks
to the mother, including possible peritonitis, hemorrhage, perforation of the viscera, and Rh immunization with
consequences for future pregnancies. A. MILUNSKY, THE PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS OF HEREDITARY
DISORDERS 5-6 (1973).
29. See generally Green, The Fetus and tie Law, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 19, 22 (A. Milunsky & G.
Annas eds. 1976).
30. E.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So.
2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Christensen v. Thomby,
192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1975).
31. E.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
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32forming an abortion, or failing to diagnose pregnancy in time for a legal
abortion to be procured, 33 with the resulting birth of a healthy child?4 The
courts have generally permitted recovery of medical costs and pain and
suffering caused by the birth 35 but have been divided on whether parents can
recover the normal costs of raising the child3 6 Cases disallowing this recovery
have reasoned that, as a matter of law, the birth of a healthy child confers
intangible benefits upon the parents which outweigh the detriments of child-
rearing. 37 This so-called "overriding benefits" doctrine as a matter of law, can
be seen in the following passage:
[T]he satisfaction, joy and companionship which normal parents have in rearing a
child make such economic loss worthwhile. These intangible benefits, while
impossible to value in dollars and cents are undoubtedly the things that make life
worthwhile. Who can place a price tag on a child's smile or the parental pride in a
child's achievement? ... Rather than attempt to value these intangible benefits,
our courts have simply determined that public sentiment recognizes that these
benefits to the parents outweigh their economic loss in rearing and educating a
healthy, normal child.
38
The cases following this reasoning have met with disapproval by some
commentators39 for the reason that in today's society, the birth of an un-
wanted child should no longer in all instances be considered a net benefit. It is
claimed that it is more realistic to allow the jury to consider the benefits
conferred by the child as mitigating factors.
The 1960s witnessed the introduction of a new kind of negligence action
involving a claim by a child that his birth occurred under conditions that
burdened his existence. The first of these wrongful life cases, Zapeda v.
Zapeda,4 ° involved the claim of an illegitimate child against his own father,
who had engaged in extra-marital sex with the plaintiff's mother after making
promises of future matrimony. The Illinois appellate court found that plaintiff
had indeed suffered a tortious injury, being burdened with the disadvantages
of illegitimacy throughout his life. Nevertheless, the court denied recovery on
the policy ground that recognition of such a cause of action would result in a
32. E.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Ladies Center of Clearwater, Inc.
v. Reno, 341 So. 2d 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
33. E.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
34. Cf. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41,356 N.E.2d 469 (1976) (negligent sterilization resulting in birth
of twins, one normal and one with deformities).
35. E.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). Contra, Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
36. Recovery was denied in Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Shaheen v. Knight, I I Pa. D. &
C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957); Terrel v. Garcia, 4% S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974);
Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964). Recovery was permitted in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (197 1); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 136 N.J.Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
37. E.g., Terrel v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
38. Id. at 128.
39. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 632-33 (1979); Robertson, Civil
Liability Arising from "Wrongful Birth" Following an Unsuccesful Sterilization Operation, 4 AM. J. LAW &
MED. 131, 151 (1978).
40. 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
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flood of cases ill-suited for adjudication: "One might seek damages for being
born of a certain color, another because of race; one for being born with a
hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate family characteris-
tics ... . ,
Several cases have been brought within the past fifteen years involving
infants suffering from birth defects. In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,42 a decision of
the New Jersey Supreme Court which that court was compelled to reconsider
in Berman v. Allan, 43 damages were sought by both the impaired child and his
parents, who contended that the defendant physicians had erroneously
informed the mother that the rubella infection she contracted early in her
pregnancy posed no risk to her child. The child was born with substantial
physical impairments. 44 The court dismissed the claims of both the child and
the parents. Concerning the child's claim, the court held the view that "life
with defects" is preferable to no life at all;45 weighing the value of life with
impairments against the "utter void of nonexistence" was "logically impos-
sible." 46 Therefore, according to the court, the child could not establish the
necessary element of damages. Concerning the parents' claims, the majority
said:
In order to determine [the parents'] compensatory damages a court would have to
evaluate the denial to them of the intangible, unmeasurable, and complex human
benefits of motherhood and fatherhood and weigh these against the alleged emo-
tional and money injuries.... When the parents say their child should not have
been born, they make it impossible for a court to measure their damages in being
the mother and father of a defective child. 47
This reasoning is similar to the overriding benefits doctrine seen in the
"healthy but unwanted" wrongful birth cases, except that instead of finding a
net benefit, as a matter of law, the Gleitman court found that the injury was
unascertainable as a matter of law. Moreover, the court held that, even
assuming Mrs. Gleitman could have procured a legal abortion at that time, it
would be against the public policy of New Jersey to allow her and her husband
to recover for "the denial of the opportunity to take an embryonic life. ' 'TM
Two courts considering similar suits in other jurisdictions several years
after Gleitman were not persuaded by the reasoning of the New Jersey court.
Jacobs v. Theimer49 and Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital" permitted parents
of children suffering from rubella-related impairments to recover costs relat-
ing to the children's special care and treatment. Both the Supreme Court of
41. 41 111. App. 2d 240, 260, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
42. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
43. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
44. 49 N.J. 22, 24-25, 227 A.2d 689, 690 (1967).
45. 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
46. Id.
47. 49 N.J. 22, 29, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
48. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
49. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
50. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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Texas and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however, followed Gleitman in
dismissing the children's claims for wrongful life.
No court in any jurisdiction recognized a cause of action for wrongful life
until 1977, when the New York Supreme Court's Appellate Division broke
with all precedent in Becker v. Schwartz5' and its companion case, Park v.
Chessin.52 In support of its recognition of a cause of action on behalf of a child
born with a genetic defect, the court said:
Inherent in the abolition of the statutory ban on abortion ... is a public policy
consideration which gives potential parents the right ... not to have a child. This
right extends to instances in which it can be determined with reasonable medical
certainty that the child would be born deformed. The breach of this right may also
be said to be tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole,
functional human being.
53
Unfortunately, the court's analysis failed to explain the gap in the logical
progression from the right of the parents not to have a child to the conclusion
that a breach of the parents' right may also constitute a wrong vis-a-vis the
fundamental right of the child. Neither did the court explain the source of this
new right to be born a whole, functional human being. These weaknesses led
most commentators to conclude that the Appellate Division's holding would
either have to be bolstered with a better theoretical foundation, or be
abandoned.54
It was at this point in the judicial development of wrongful birth and
wrongful life that Becker v. Schwartz and Berman v. Allan came to be heard
by the high courts of New York and New Jersey.
III. FACTS AND HOLDINGS
Becker v. Schwartz55 considered the consolidated appeals of two cases
from the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. 6 In the first case,
Dolores Becker, 37 years of age, conceived a child in the fall of 1974. She
engaged the services of the defendants, specialists in the field of obstetrics
51. 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978).
52. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978).
53. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
54. See, e.g., Cohen, Park v. Chessin: The Continuing Judicial Development of the Theory of"Wrongful
Life," 4 AM. J. LAW & MED. 212, 214 (1978); Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for
Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongfil Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401,
1443-44. But see Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (recognizing
infant's wrongful life cause of action against laboratory for failing to diagnose Tay-Sachs disease). The
Curlender opinion is remarkable as an example ofjudicial facility in solving difficult analytical problems by
side-step.
"55. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
56. Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80,400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d401,
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1975). The Park case involved allegedly negligent pre-conception genetic
counseling, not prenatal diagnosis, and falls outside the scope of this Comment. Many of the issues in claims for
preconception torts are identical, however, to claims for negligent prenatal diagnosis.
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and gynecology, who cared for her throughout her pregnancy. In 1975, Mrs.
Becker gave birth to an infant who suffered from Down's syndrome. Mr. and
Mrs. Becker contended that defendants never advised them of the risk of
giving birth to a child with Down's syndrome, which risk increases with
maternal age, or of the availability of amniocentesis to determine whether the
fetus was affected with the chromosomal anomaly causing that disorder. The
Beckers claimed that, had they known their child would be born with the
genetic impairment, they would have aborted the child. The Beckers com-
menced an action seeking damages on behalf of the child for wrongful life, and
on their own behalf for the expenses of long-term care of the child, emotional
and physical injury suffered as a result of the birth, and loss of Mrs. Becker's
services. 7
Upon motion by the defendants, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint in its entirety for failing to state a cause of action. 58 The Appellate
Division modified the order on appeal, sustaining the plaintiffs' complaint
except for the parents' claims for emotional distress.5
Analyzing the claims under traditional medical malpractice theory, the
New York Court of Appeals found two flaws in the infant's claim for wrongful
life. First, the court found that the infant had not suffered any legally cogniz-
able injury. While the Appellate Division had envisioned a basis for the
infant's claim in a "fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole,
functional human being," the Court of Appeals tersely dismissed this idea:
[T]here is no precedent for recognition [of such a right].... Not only is there to
be found no predicate at common law or in statutory enactment for judicial recog-
nition of the birth of a defective child as an injury to the child; the implications of
any such proposition are staggering.
A second flaw found by the court was the impossibility of measuring
damages. Since the remedy afforded by law is a measure of damages calcu-
lated to put the plaintiff in the position that he would have been in but for the
negligence of the defendant, such a measure here would require "a compari-
son between the Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexis-
tence. This comparison the law is not equipped to make."-
61
The claim of the parents, however, stood on a different footing: "Plain-
tiffs state causes of action in their own right predicated upon a breach of a
duty flowing from defendants to themselves, as prospective parents, resulting
in damage to plaintiffs for which compensation may be readily fixed." 62 Citing
its earlier decision in Howard v. Lecher,63 the court went on to limit the
57. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 405-06, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808-09, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896-97 (1978).
58. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 386 N.E.2d 807, 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (1978).
59. 60 A.D.2d 587, 588, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120 (1977).
60. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978).
61. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
62. Id. at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
63. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977). In Howard v. Lecher, parents sought damages
for emotional injury for the birth of a child with Tay-Sach's disease. The Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision,
dismissed the action on the ground that the parents were in the position of bystanders who witnessed the
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parents' compensation by denying recovery for psychic or emotional distress
caused by the birth of the child in an impaired state. The court noted that the
parents might yet experience love and affection for the child,64 and that to
assess damages for emotional harm would require consideration of this factor
in mitigation of the parents' emotional injuries. "[Such a] calculation of plain-
,,65tiffs' emotional injuries remains too speculative to permit recovery ....
In a dissenting opinion, 66 two of the judges would have dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint in toto. In the dissenters' view, the Beckers' claims could
be valid only if seen as derivative to the child's claim, since it was the child
who suffered the physical impairment. The child had no valid claim either; the
defendants' conduct in no way caused the child's injury, which was geneti-
cally determined. The majority "has created a kind of medical paternity suit.
It is a tort without precedent, and at variance with existing precedents both
old and new .... [T]hese cases pose a problem which can only be properly
resolved by a legislative body, and not by courts of law." 67
Berman v. Allan6' presented the courts of New Jersey with factual allega-
tions almost identical to those considered by the New York court in Becker.
Like Mrs. Becker, Mrs. Berman sought medical care from two practicing
obstetricians when she became pregnant in 1974. She was 38 years old at the
time. She alleged that her physicians failed to inform her during the pregnancy
of the availability of amniocentesis, or of the increased risk for women of her
age of bearing a child afflicted with Down's syndrome. In addition, she
alleged that if the defendants had so informed her, she would have submitted
to amniocentesis, discovered that the fetus was afflicted, and had the fetus
aborted. Instead, Mrs. Berman gave birth to Sharon, who exhibited Down's
syndrome. 69
Sharon, by her guardian ad litem, sought compensation for the physical
and emotional pain that she would endure throughout her life because of her
condition. Mr. and Mrs. Berman sought damages for the emotional anguish
that they had experienced and would continue to experience because of
physical injuries of their child. Like most jurisdictions, New York follows the "zone of danger" rule, which
denies recovery for emotional injury unless the plaintiffwas in physical peril from the same negligent conduct as
a third person who was physically injured. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). The application of this rule to wrongful birth cases has rightly been critized as inappro-
priate, considering that the parents in wrongful birth cases allege the breach of a duty owed directly to them, and
not that the defendant "caused" the child's defect. See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 618, 640-41 (1979). In Becker, the majority concurred in the result of Howard, but no longer
subscribed to the reasoning of that case.
64. The court's speculation on this point was probably inaccurate concerning the Beckers. While they were
pursuing their claim for "long-term institutional care" of their child in the courts, the Beckers had placed their
daughter up for adoption. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1979, at 23, col. 1.
65. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 415, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 902 (1978).
66. Id. at 417-22, 386 N.E.2d at 816-19, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 9&4-07.
67. Id. at 422, 386 N.E.2d at 819, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
68. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
69. Id. at 423-24, 404 A.2d at 10.
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Sharon's condition, and expenses that they would incur in raising, educating,
and supervising Sharon.70
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Rely-
ing on Gleitman v. Cosgrove,7' the trial judge ruled that plaintiffs had failed to
state a cause of action. While an appeal of that ruling was pending before the
court of appeals, the New Jersey Supreme Court certified the case for review
on its own motion.72
Accepting as true each of the plaintiffs' allegations, the court considered
the sufficiency of the child's and the parents' claims separately. The child's
claim, said the majority, could not stand:
[A] claim predicated upon wrongful life ... would require the trier of fact to
measure the difference in value between life in an impaired condition and the
"utter void of nonexistence." Such an endeavor.., is literally impos-
sible ....
Difficulty in the measure of damages is not, however, our sole concern....
[W]e conclude... that Sharon has not suffered any damage cognizable at law by
being brought into existence. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz .... 73
Concerning the parents' claims, the court reconsidered its earlier deci-
sion in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,74 a 1967 case which held that parents of a
deformed child could not recover from a physician who had failed to warn the
mother of the risks to her child from rubella. The Gleitman majority had
concluded that substantial public policy reasons precluded the allowance of
tort damages to the parents for the denial of the opportunity to abort their
child.75 The Berman majority now believed that the Supreme Court ruling in
Roe v. Wade76 reversed New Jersey's public policy on abortion. "Public
policy now supports, rather than militates against, the proposition that [a
woman] not be impermissibly denied a meaningful opportunity to make that
decision .... [A] physician whose negligence has deprived a mother of this
opportunity should be required to make amends for the damage which he has
proximately caused." 77
Oddly, the New Jersey Supreme Court then took away what it had just
seemed ready to give, by refusing to allow the Bermans to recover for any
pecuniary damages arising from Sharon's birth. The court said that "such an
award would be wholly disproportionate to the culpability involved [and]
would both constitute a windfall to the parents and place too unreasonable a
financial burden upon physicians.- 7 8 Instead, the majority believed that an
70. Id. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10-11.
71. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). See text accompanying notes 42-48 supra.
72. 80 N.J. 421, 425, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979).
73. Id. at 428-29, 404 A.2d at 12 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
74. 49, N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
75. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
76. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
77. 80 N.J. 421, 432, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
78. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
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,appropriate basis for recovery was the parents' emotional distress "deriving
from Mrs. Berman's loss of her right to abort the fetus.",
79
In a rambling dissent,80 Judge Handler said he would allow the child's
claim for wrongful life, based upon the injury of "diminished childhood." In
his view, Sharon had been damaged by being born to parents who were "less
fit to accept and assume their parental responsibilities," 8 ' a condition which
Handler believed was directly attributable to the defendants' negligence.
IV. TowARD RATIONAL LIMITS ON LIABILITY
Both the New York Court of Appeals and the New Jersey Supreme Court
envisaged the claims before them in Becker 82 and Berman83 as falling within
the traditional' framework of medical malpractice. As such, the parents' cause
of action for wrongful birth is analyzed according to the familiar formula of
duty, breach, proximate cause, and cognizable damages. 84
In the absence of a warranty, a medical practitioner is not considered to
guarantee the results of his care. 85 Thus, a medical practitioner acting in the
role of genetic counselor can be held liable for the birth of a "less-than-
perfect" child only if the birth of that child was caused by the practitioner's
negligence. The practitioner is not an insurer of the genetic well-being of each
newborn.
At the same time, a woman's ability to choose whether to give birth to a
child with a genetic impairment is directly dependent upon information that is
generally available only from professionals. Her "right" to give birth to a
child that comports with her hopes is limited (1) to the extent that medical
knowledge remains incomplete and (2) by the amount of information and
diagnostic service that is made available to her. The law of tort has little effect
on the former, but undoubtedly can influence the latter by establishing and
defining the medical practitioner's legal duty. This is particularly true in an
area of professional practice like genetic counseling, which has not yet
developed its own comprehensive standards.86
Becker and Berman have decided, for their respective jurisdictions, that
the parents' "injury" of bearing a "defective" child, caused by the negligence
of another, is a compensable harm; hence, the interest of a couple in avoiding
the birth of a "defective" child is now to be afforded the protection of the law.
79. Id. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14.
80. Id. at 434-46, 404 A.2d at 15-21.
81. Id. at 442, 404 A.2d at 19.
82. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 410, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899 (1978).
83. 80 N.J. 421, 434, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (1979) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
85. See, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W.Va. 1967); Lane v. Cohen, 201 So. 2d 805 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967). A few courts have permitted a claim for medical malpractice based on a contract theory of
implied promise to exercise reasonable skill. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Saunders, 266 C.S. 394, 223 S.E.2d 602
(1975). In most jurisdictions, however, such claims must be brought in tort. See Note, Establishing the Con-
tractual Liability of Physicians, 7. U. CAL. DAV. L. REV. 84 (1974).
86. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra. and notes 91-93 infra.
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It will be left to future cases, however, to determine precisely where the outer
bounds of that protection lie. The most important bound-setting element in
the theory of liability is the standard of care.
A. The Standard of Care
As in any negligence action, parents seeking to recover damages for the
birth of a "defective" child must prove at trial that the defendant in some way
failed to perform in accordance with the standard of care established by law.
The conduct complained of may have been either nonfeasance or misfea-
sance-that is, an act of omission or an act of commission. A practitioner
may have failed to disclose information that the plaintiff claims would have
led her to avoid the birth, or he may have conveyed inaccurate information,
reliance upon which led the plaintiff to make a wrong decision. Since, in either
case, the disclosure of information has meaning only in relation to the plain-
tiff's decision-making ability, the relevant question is whether the defendant
practitioner failed to give the plaintiff legally adequate information to afford
her a "meaningful opportunity to make the decision. " 87
This question of legal adequacy, which is merely a more precise way of
asking whether the defendant breached the standard of care, can clearly be
seen to involve two different aspects of the defendant's conduct. The first of
these aspects comprehends the level of expert knowledge and skill that the
defendant is expected to exercise in the scope of his practice. For the pur-
poses of this discussion this aspect will be termed the "knowledge aspect."
Functions of this aspect include the defendant's ability to recognize the exis-
tence of certain genetic risks and the appropriateness of using diagnostic
tools, the skill required to interpret test results accurately, and the ability to
perceive the need to refer a client to a specialist. The second aspect, on the
other hand, encompasses the act of communicating information to a client.
The legal adequacy of this communication may depend not only on whether
information is disclosed, but also on the extent of the information disclosed
and the manner in which it is conveyed. This aspect will be termed the
"communication aspect."
There are two distinct approaches that by analogy can be used to set the
standard of care owed by a medical practitioner acting in the role of genetic
counselor. Under the traditional professional standard applied in other medi-
cal malpractice cases, a defendant's allegedly negligent conduct is measured
against the established norms of the defendant's professional peers.
88
Normally, this standard is not familiar to laypersons and must be established
at trial through expert testimony.89 In relation to the knowledge aspect, this
87. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 432, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
88. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 194-217 (1977); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 at 165 (4th ed. 1971).
89. E.g., Shea v. Phillips, 213 Ga. 269, 98 S.E.2d 552 (1957); Beane v. Perley, 99 N.H. 309, 109 A.2d 848
(1954).
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means that the defendant practitioner is required to possess the learning and
skill that are commonly possessed by members of the profession in good
standing. 90 In relation to the communication aspect, the practitioner will be
held to owe a duty to disclose to his client the information that a reasonable
medical practitioner would disclose in similar circumstances. 9'
It is apparent that at the present time, judicial reliance on the professional
standard in the area of genetic counseling will work in favor of defendant
practitioners. At the present stage in the development of genetic counseling,
plaintiffs are likely to have difficulty proving through expert testimony that a
particular application of prenatal diagnosis is standard practice. In addition,
plaintiffs in many jurisdictions may face the harsh consequences of the local-
ity rule, 92 under which the defendant's responsibility is measured against the
norms of practice in his or similar communities. This can pose a large obstacle
to plaintiffs who live in small communities where genetic services are limited.
If the plaintiff's complaint is that the practitioner did not disclose sufficient
information in a way that the plaintiff could understand-a breach of the
communication aspect of the standard-the plaintiff is certain to have a diffi-
cult time establishing the professional standard in this regard:
[N]ot only do genetic counselors appear to lack tools to evaluate whether they are
counseling properly and achieving the results that should be expected, but the
very notion of "expectations" is rendered doubtful by the existence of diverse
schools of thought, rather than a professional consensus on the right way to
counsel. 9
3
It is for these reasons that several commentators have suggested a differ-
ent approach to setting the standard of care in the area of genetic counseling. 94
The suggested approach is to apply a standard analogous to the lay standard
of the doctrine of informed consent, which has been applied in several recent
medical malpractice cases. 95 Under this standard the relevant question is not
"what other physicians typically do," but "what a reasonable patient would
90. See generally I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 194,200-06 (1977). A classic
formulation of this standard is found in Zoterell v. Repp, 187 Mich. 319,330, 153 N.W. 692,696 (1915) (physician
must "bring and apply to the case in hand that degree of skill, care, knowledge, and attention ordinarily
possessed and exercised by practitioners of the medical profession under like circumstances").
91. E.g., Green v. Hussey, 127 II1. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E.2d 156 (1970); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,
350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
92. E.g., Siirila v. Barrios, 58 Mich. App. 721, 228 N.W.2d 801 (1975). Some courts have held that
community standards are only one factor to be considered in determining the issue of negligence. E.g., Shier v.
Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973). Other jurisdictions have disposed of the locality rule
altogether, imposing a uniform standard of care on all physicians. E.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.
Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
93. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 628-29 (1979).
94. Id. at 629-30; Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate
Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1507-08 (1978).
95. See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs




want to know under the circumstances." 96 The standard focuses the analysis
on the patient qua decision-maker, in recognition of her right to exercise
control over her own medical care. The basic aim of the informed consent
doctrine-to respect the patient's right to access of information-is particu-
larly relevant to the communication aspect of the defendant's conduct, since
it is concerned with the flow of information from the genetic counselor to his
patient. One commentator has explained the application of the lay informed
consent standard to genetic counseling in these words:
Although doctors in the contexts of both informed consent and genetic counseling
are not to make the ultimate choice among various courses of action, they possess
information that [patients] often cannot otherwise easily obtain. Indeed, it is
usually only through physician disclosure that prospective parents will be given
the opportunity to act to avert the birth of children with genetic defects. Thus
doctors should be required to inform prospective parents of all the genetic risks
and reproductive options that a reasonable person would want to know in deciding
whether to procreate.97
The adoption of the lay informed consent standard in genetic counseling
would be philosophically consistent with the interest of parents that the
Becker and Berman decisions purport to protect. It would also vitiate the
problems facing a plaintiff trying to establish a fixed professional standard of
disclosure when such a standard may not exist. Nevertheless, this Comment
urges that the lay informed consent standard not be applied in cases involving
negligent prenatal diagnosis. The adoption of this standard would inevitably
force medical practitioners to respond to a market for genetic information that
has essentially nothing to do with prevention of disease. Under Roe v.
Wade, 98 a woman does not need to have a medical reason to obtain an abor-
tion; her right to choose abortion is deemed to be unqualified, at least
throughout the first two trimesters of pregnancy. 99 A fortiori, a woman can
choose, in the absence of a compelling state interest to the contrary, to abort
her child for any reason. Selective abortion for the purpose of avoiding an
undesirable genetic characteristic and selective abortion for the purpose of
producing a child with desirable genetic characteristics are simply two sides
of the same coin. Without doubt, many parents would choose abortion for a
variety of reasons other than prevention of a medically defined disorder. For
example, parents could claim that their physician's negligent failure to advise
them of the availability of amniocentesis or to disclose fully the laboratory
96. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 629 (1979). See Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
97. Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic
Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1507-08 (1978).
98. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99. Roe v. Wade is frequently interpreted to mean that the state may not prohibit abortions within the first
three months of pregnancy. E.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 431-32, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979). The decision's
protection extends much further, however. Even in the last trimester, the Roe Court said the state could not
prohibit abortion when necessary to preserve the health of the mother. "Health" in this context includes
emotional health. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). In effect, the right to abortion is nearly absolute
throughout the entire period of gestation. See J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE 10-12 (1979).
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results of the procedure caused them to give birth to a child of the "wrong"
sex. Under the lay informed consent standard, these parents would have only
to convince a jury that the availability of amniocentesis to determine the sex
of their fetus is information that a reasonable person would find relevant to
reproductive decision-making.' I° They could at least recover damages for
emotional distress under the Berman rule of damages,'I ' and could theoreti-
cally recover the total costs of raising the child under the Becker rule of
damages.' 02 The result of imposing the lay informed consent standard in the
field of prenatal diagnosis would be to coerce medical practitioners to partici-
pate in parents' pursuit of the perfect child, by placing those practitioners who
decline such a role at risk of incurring civil liability. This result seems wrong,
and for good reason. It is inappropriate from the viewpoint of both the medi-
cal profession, which has some valid claim to the right of determining the
proper allocation of health care resources, and consumers, who ultimately
share the costs of malpractice liability.
Precisely because of the potential for unusual and controversial applica-
tions of prenatal diagnosis, a finding of liability for negligence in this area
should be predicated upon a deviation from a clearly recognizable standard of
care, not the uncertain standard of "what a patient would want to know under
the circumstances." The traditional professional standard should thus be
applied by courts recognizing an action for the birth of a "defective" child.
Any difficulty that a plaintiff may face in establishing the existence of profes-
sional norms in the area of prenatal diagnosis should support a finding of
nonliability; it should not justify the adoption of a different, inappropriate
standard merely to help plaintiffs with their case.
B. Damages
The overriding problem for the courts in parents' claims for wrongful
birth has been the issue of damages. An attempt to fit compensation for the
100. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)
(materiality of the information withheld from the patient need not be established by expert testimony); Sard v.
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977) (proper test for measuring the physiciap's duty to disclose risk
information is whether such data is material to the patient's decision, to be decided by the jury). A claim by
parents alleging the denial of the opportunity to avoid the birth of a child of the "wrong" sex will seem
far-fetched only to those who have not kept abreast of the current trends in family planning. In one documented
series of women offered amniocentesis and told the gender of their unborn children, twenty-nine (assumedly
.'reasonable") women out of forty-six who were informed that their children would be girls chose to abort. Of
fifty-three women informed that their children would be boys, only one chose to abort. C. RICE, BEYOND
ABORTION 98 (1979).
While scattered reports of this kind cannot be taken as scientific measurements of public attitudes, indica-
tions are that the use of prenatal diagnosis for selecting sex has so far been limited more by the unwillingness of
physicians to provide this service, rather than a lack of demand on the part of prospective parents. See Letter to
the Editor from A. Etzioni, 863 LANCET 932 (1974)(reporting results of a survey in which 95 percent of
physicians questioned disapproved of using amniocentesis for gender selection). Recently, the Johns Hopkins
hospital in Baltimore, Maryland, adopted a policy of performing amniocentesis for gender selection for any
couple that requests it and undergoes counseling regarding the risks involved. Kazazian, A Medical Viei, in
Prenatal Diagnosis for Sex Choice, 10 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 15, 17 (1980).
101. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
102. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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birth of an impaired child into the traditional framework of tort damages is at
best precarious. One commentator has succinctly placed the problem in per-
spective:
It is one thing to compensate destruction; it is quite another to compensate crea-
tion. This so-called "wrong" is unique: it is a new and on-going condition. As life,
it necessarily interacts with other lives. Indeed, it draws its "injurious" nature
from the predilections of the other lives it touches. It is naive to suggest that such a
situation falls neatly into conventional tort principles, producing neatly calculable
results. 03
If the traditional rule of negligence law'04 were applied in wrongful birth
cases to compensate the plaintiff for all injuries proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence, the only limitation on recovery would lie in counsel's
creativity. An inexhaustive list of possible items of recovery gleaned from
previous wrongful birth cases might include: the costs of raising and educating
the child;1°5 lost wages;'t 6 medical and hospital costs related to delivery; 07
physical and emotional pain related to the pregnancy and delivery;' 0" "physi-
cal inconvenience" of rearing an unwanted child;'09 and loss of consortium. "o
In addition, when the child is born with physical or mental disabilities,
recovery might include the special costs relating to treatment and care, and
damages for emotional distress caused by the birth. Concern over the pros-
pect of staggering damage awards is apparent in the Becker and Berman
decisions; both courts sought to limit damages by holding that certain items of
injury are not compensable. Beyond this commonality, however, the cases
cannot be reconciled. An elemental confusion of principles is evident in the
fact that the two courts reached diametrically opposed conclusions about
what items of injury should properly be compensated.
In Becker, parents sought damages for the cost of "the long-term institu-
tional care of their retarded child," whom, the parents alleged, they would
have aborted were it not for the defendants' negligence in failing to disclose
the risk of genetic defect causing Down's syndrome."'. The parents also
sought damages for emotional harm caused by the birth of their child in an
impaired condition. " 2 The New York Court of Appeals upheld the claim for
expenses incurred in the long-term institutional care of their child, but refused
to permit recovery for emotional harm.' ' Concerning the claims for pecuniary
expenses, the majority said: "Calculation of damages necessary to make
103. Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling By Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL. L. REV. 127,
170 (1978).
104. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 137 at 560-61 (1935).
105. E.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
106. E.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. E.g., Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975).
110. E.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
IlI. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 406. 386 N.E.2d 807, 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (1978).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03.
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plaintiffs whole in relation to these expenditures requires nothing extraordi-
nary."" 4 The court equivocated, however, saying, "[tihere is now no occa-
sion, in passing on the sufficiency of the complaints to state a cause of action,
to determine with particularity what items of expense or loss may properly be
taken into account in computation of the damages recoverable. ' '" 5 As the
dissenting judge pointed out, the majority's analysis would seemingly entitle
parents in other cases to recover all of the costs associated with raising an
impaired child."16 This measure of recovery is admittedly logical; in the
absence of the physician's nondisclosure, the parents claim they would have
avoided the birth of the child, and therefore would not have been burdened
with any of the costs of raising the child.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Berman also took as the basic
measure of pecuniary damages the total costs of raising and caring for the
child. 117 The Berman court disallowed recovery for pecuniary injury, how-
ever, citing three reasons." 8 First, recovery of such damages would be
"wholly disproportionate" to the physician's culpability. Second, to allow
this recovery would place too unreasonable a financial burden upon physi-
cians. Finally, recovery would constitute a "windfall" for the parents, who
would "retain all the benefits inhering in the birth of the child ... while
saddling defendants with the enormous expenses attendant upon her
rearing." 119
The first of these reasons advanced by the New Jersey court for denying
compensation of pecuniary losses is not a rule of damages, but a liability-
limiting policy consideration. As applied by the Berman court, however, the
culpability argument is wholly unconvincing. In traditional tort law, a defen-
dant will be found to have been either negligent or not negligent according to
the applicable legal standard. If negligent, the defendant should be liable for
all injury to the plaintiff's interests that the negligent conduct proximately
caused. Aside from the recovery of punitive damages in certain cases, culpa-
bility should play no role in determining damages. The court's use of this
criterion to limit recovery of certain items of injury while permitting recovery
for others is strained to the point of being nonsensical.
The second argument of the New Jersey court-that recovery of
pecuniary losses would place an unreasonable burden on physicians-must
likewise be recognized as a make-weight argument. Assuming, arguendo, that
the costs of raising and treating an impaired child constitute an injury to the
plaintiffs' interests, the court offers no reason why placing this burden on the
defendant is "unreasonable." These costs must devolve to someone; the
114. Id. at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 421-22, 386 N.E.2d at 818, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 906-07.





defendant, who presumably carries insurance for such risks, is arguably in a
much better position to bear them than the parents.
The third reason advanced by the court for denying recovery of
pecuniary losses-that such recovery would be a windfall to the parents-is
actually a restatement of the overriding benefits doctrine seen in some earlier
wrongful birth cases. 20 The theory is that the intangible benefits conferred
upon the parents--"the love and joy they will experience as parents"' 2 -- out-
weigh the pecuniary expenses incurred by the birth. The Berman court
seriously weakened the force of its own analysis, however, by allowing
recovery for emotional anguish. If the benefits inhering in the birth of the
child are to be set off against the detriments, intangible emotional benefits
should logically be compared to the emotional harm caused by the birth. This
would be consistent with section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the
plaintiff which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
22
Striking out upon its own muddled course, however, the Berman court com-
pared pecuniary damages with emotional benefits, and left emotional harm
completely out of the balance. Firmly believing that "the monetary equivalent
of [emotional] distress is an appropriate measure of the harm suffered by the
parents deriving from Mrs. Berman's loss of her right to abort," 23 the court
disregarded logic and traditional rules of damages, passed over the tangible
pecuniary elements of injury, and opted to allow recovery for the intangible,
subjective, and purely speculative element of emotional distress.
The New York Court of Appeals in Becker followed a better reasoned
approach to damages for emotional distress. The New York court correctly
perceived that if parents claim emotional distress caused by the birth of the
child, damages for that distress must, in fairness, be mitigated by the intan-
gible benefits inherent in the parent-child relationship. 124 The court then held
that any comparison for this purpose is simply too speculative to permit
recovery. 125
This Comment proposes that, if parents are recognized to have a cause of
action in tort for the birth of a "defective" child, damages should be limited to
the pecuniary expenses relating to the special care required by the child which
exceed the normal expenses associated with raising a healthy child. This
measure of damages, although not accepted by either the New York Court of
120. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
121. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 432, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) (emphasis added).
123. 80 N.J. 421, 433, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
124. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 414-15, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 902 (1978).
125. Id. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (1978).
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Appeals or the New Jersey Supreme Court, does have some judicial sup-
port. 1
26
Recovery of pecuniary costs should be limited to the costs directly
related to the child's impairment, not the total costs of raising the child. It is
not necessary, in order to justify this measure of recovery, to adopt the fiction
that the parents would have given birth to a normal, healthy child in the
absence of the defendant's negligence. It can be justified simply by looking to
the specific financial interest of the plaintiffs that was injured. 27 Unlike the
plaintiffs in the "healthy but unwanted" child wrongful birth cases, the
parents in Becker and Berman desired to have a child. They did not engage the
defendants' services for the purpose of preventing reproduction, but for
furthering the normal process of pregnancy. It is fair to presume that they
were ready and willing to assume the financial burdens normally associated
with raising a child. The specific interest that they allege has been injured is
not the broad "right to abort,"' 28 as the New Jersey Supreme Court would
have it; rather, the gravamen of the complaint is that they were denied the
opportunity to avoid the birth of this specific child with its specific "defect."
Thus, to the extent that public policy permits any recovery at all, 29 it is both
logical and just to restrict recovery of economic damages to the costs relating
to the "defect." Such costs may include special medical, nursing, custodial,
and educational expenses that the parents would not have incurred by the
birth of a healthy child.
Plaintiffs should also be precluded from recovering damages for items
such as physical pain and suffering related to childbirth, loss of income, loss
of consortium, and lost opportunities, except to the extent that plaintiffs can
prove that any of these are related to the child's impairment, since each
detriment would have been experienced with the birth of a healthy child
anyway.
The approach of the New York of Appeals in Becker in denying damages
for emotional distress should be recognized as sound. A fundamental prin-
ciple of damages requires the plaintiff to prove facts upon which the trier of
fact can base a just and reasonable valuation of damage. 30 This would require
the plaintiffs to prove that they suffered emotional harm by the birth of their
child that they would not have suffered had the child's life been terminated in
126. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975)(recovery for parents ofa child with rubella-related
deformities limited to the special costs relating to care and treatment); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp.. 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (same).
127. See Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). In Christensen, the first recorded
case involving a wrongful birth claim, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied recovery to parents of a healthy
child after an unsuccessful sterilization on the ground that plaintiffs' interest had not been injured. Evidence at
trial showed that the operation had been sought not to prevent the expenses of child-raising, but to avoid
endangering the mother's precarious health; ultimately the mother's health was not harmed by the birth. Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281, comment g (1965).
128. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 432, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
129. See text accompanying notes 155-160 infra.
130. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.3 (1973).
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utero. The jury would be required to place a value upon a subjective state that
the plaintiffs did not actually experience. Any valuation in dollars and cents of
the parents' emotional damage would be based not on fact, but upon pure
speculation. And, if the emotional benefits conferred by the child are offset
against the damage in mitigation, the speculation is compounded. Claims of
this nature should not be recognized.
The limitations on damages for the birth of a "defective" child that this
Comment proposes would have several beneficial effects. Since potential
plaintiffs would know that they could not recover the total costs of raising
their child, parents would be inhibited from asserting fraudulent claims in the
hope of winning a huge recovery. Strictly limiting recovery to those pecuniary
expenses related to the child's condition would, to some extent, diminish the
undesirable social effect that will inevitably result from this type of litiga-
tion-the placing of a price tag on human life based on its perceived quality-
and affirm our fundamental belief that the responsibility to raise and care for
children belongs primarily to their natural parents.13' Finally, limited recovery
ought to satisfy those who conceive the law of negligence as a force to deter
future negligent conduct.
32
V. LIABILITY FOR THE BIRTH OF A DEFECTIVE CHILD:
DEFECTIVE JUDICIAL LEGISLATING?
A cause of action imposing liability for the birth of a genetically impaired
child is a new tort, unknown at common law. Indeed, this type of litigation
could never have come into existence without the abrupt and relatively recent
changes that have occurred in the law and the technology relating to human
reproduction. Science has developed the means of discovering human genetic
traits in utero, allowing parents to know many characteristics of their children
before the children are born. The United States Supreme Court has made
abortion the right of every woman, allowing parents to act on the information
gained through technology. 133 Now, the Becker and Berman decisions indicate
that the courts are willing to make this application of technology a legally
protected interest, by imposing liability when the technology is wrongfully
withheld.
At the same time, the Becker and Berman decisions unfortunately indi-
cate a failure by the courts to give adequate consideration to the serious social
implications of imposing this liability. A cause of action arising from the birth
of a "defective" child involves delicate questions of professional responsibil-
ity, the valuation of human life based upon its perceived quality, and the
131. See, e.g., Massey v. Flinn, 198 Ark. 279, 128 S.W.2d 1008 (1939) (father may not contract away his
obligation to financially support his child).
132. "[To deny recovery] would in effect immunize from liability those in the medical field providing
inadequate guidance to persons who would choose to exercise their constitutional right to abort
fetuses .... '" Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 432, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
133. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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sensitive moral and policy issues of eugenic abortion. The judicial activism in
recognizing this new cause of action has demonstrated a woeful disregard for
these issues.
A. Malpractice and the Technological Imperative
In describing how the courts assimilate new technological developments
in the field of human genetics, it has been said that judge-made law is "essen-
tially backwards-looking" '34-that is, it strives to compensate persons who
have already suffered some injury, and not to prescribe how medical science
should control the use of technology in the future. Yet, it cannot be seriously
doubted that court decisions creating liability for the birth of a genetically
impaired child are potently forceful in shaping professional standards of con-
duct. Most physicians, reacting to exorbitant malpractice insurance rates and
the threat of personal liability, believe that they "must practice defensively,
and do so."135 After the Becker decision, it was predicted that amniocentesis
would be employed in all pregnancies "on legal grounds, not medical
grounds." 36 Some physicians report that they use amniocentesis on women
below 35 years of age even though such women are not subject to an elevated
risk of bearing a child with a chromosomal anomaly. A major factor in promo-
ting such practices, they acknowledge, is fear of liability.
37
At the heart of this progression-increased use of technology in response
to court-created liability-lies an internal inconsistency that the courts and
commentators have not addressed. While courts are analysing medical practi-
tioner's conduct according to professional standards, the legal interest of the
parent-plaintiffs that the courts are purporting to protect has nothing to do
with medicine, except in a most Pickwickian sense. The decision to abort a
fetus afflicted with Down's syndrome is not a medical decision, but a
personal, ethical, and social decision. Although it is true that a medical
professional's expert knowledge and cooperation are required if parents are to
exercise the choice to abort, it does not follow that this use of technology is
simply a matter of professional standards. A far more basic question to be
asked, but scarcely reached by the Becker and Berman opinions, is what
policy reasons justify the imposition of an affirmative legal duty to employ
prenatal diagnosis.
If court decisions establish prenatal diagnosis of genetic disorders as a
duty owed to all parents at risk of bearing a genetically impaired child, a long,
albeit unconscious, step will have been taken in the direction of removing this
application of technology from the realm of personal decision-making and
134. Green, The Fetus and the Law, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 19, 24 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds.
1976).
135. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 667 n.206 (1979).
136. Doctors Held Liable in Abnormal Births, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1978, at B6, col. 4.




transferring it into the class of judgments known as "medical indications."
This subtle change in professional and public awareness will have far-reaching
implications. Social pressures may well inhibit, rather than reinforce,
autonomous decision-making by parents who would choose to give birth to a
child with substantial impairments. 138 There have already been suggestions
that medical insurers might refuse to provide coverage to women who refuse
to undergo amniocentesis and abort an abnormal fetus. 3 9
Of course, there is a very real possiblity that our health care systems will
arrive at the same point in establishing norms for the use of prenatal diagnos-
tic technology without prodding by the courts. It seems far preferable, how-
ever, to allow this standard-setting process, entailing as it does such serious
implications for society, to evolve naturally in response to broad-based
social needs and public policy as expressed by legislative action, rather than
in reaction to the fear of malpractice liability.
B. "Defectiveness"--A New Determinator of Legal Rights?
Another cause for concern with the judicial recognition of a cause of
action for the birth of a genetically impaired child is the apparent willingness
of courts to decide cases on little more than the judges' personal perception of
the value of the "defective" life in question. Of course, courts are called upon
every day to make subjective judgments in critical matters; yet, it is important
to recognize this judicial decision-making function in wrongful birth cases so
that a critical examination can be focused on the underlying basis of these
decisions.
An example of judicial subjectivity is evidenced by two wrongful birth
decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In 1974, the court ruled in Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co. 40 that parents who gave birth to a healthy child had
no cause of action against a physician who negligently failed to diagnose the
woman's pregnancy in time for her to procure a legal abortion. The court cited
two policy reasons for denying recovery, either of which, the court said, alone
would have been sufficient basis for denial of recovery. 4 One year later, in
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 142 the same court was faced with the claim
of parents who sought wrongful birth damages against a physician who failed
to diagnose rubella during the woman's pregnancy; she gave birth to a child
with deformities caused by the infection. Here, without disturbing the Rieck
decision, the court allowed recovery. 143 The compelling policy reasons against
138. Callahan, The Meaning and Significance of Genetic Disease: Philosophical Perspectives, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS 83, 85 (B. Hilton et al. eds. 1973).
139. See Thompson & Greenfield, Rights and Responsibilities of the Insurer, in GENETICS AND THE LAW
289 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976).
140. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
141. To allow recovery, said the court, would open the way for fraudulent claims and would place too
unreasonable a burden upon physicians. Id. at 518-19, 219 N.W.2d at 244-45.
142. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
143. Id.
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recognizing a cause of action for the unwanted birth of a healthy child had
suddenly vanished in the case of a deformed child.
Following the advice of Llewellyn to look not to what the Wisconsin
court said, but to what it did,44 it is obvious that the court created a legal
classification affecting important legal rights based purely upon the court's
perception of the quality of the human life under consideration. In Rieck, the
parents did not want a child, normal or abnormal. In Dumer, the parents
wanted a child but not an abnormal child. In each case, the child had already
been conceived and the alleged negligence of the physician was in failing to
diagnose a condition that would have led the woman to get an abortion. In the
view of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the birth of a normal, healthy child is
not a compensable injury as a matter of law, but the birth of a deformed child
is.
It is possible to see in this development an understandable judicial
response to perceived tragedy. No doubt the Wisconsin court in Dumer felt a
particular sympathy for the parents of the impaired child. The New Jersey
Supreme Court probably felt a similar sympathy for the Bermans, when it
said, citing no precedent, "We feel that the monetary equivalent of [the
Bermans' emotional anguish] is an appropriate measure of the harm suf-
fered . . . .'"45 It is appropriate, however, to question whether this subjective
and arbitrary manner of decision-making is a proper foundation for legal
precedent. If cases were decided on an ad hoc basis, there might be small
cause for concern; but our system of judicial lawmaking is one in which
individual decisions have much broader repercussions. If the underlying
principle is that compensation depends upon defectiveness, it is not difficult
to imagine the problematic aspects of applying such a principle. "Defective"
and "normal" are impossible to define. In the context of genetic health, how
far from "normal" must a child's genotype or phenotype deviate to permit
recovery? It is estimated that every human carries from five to eight "bad"
genes. 146
Once the principle is established that the parents' rights are dependent on
their child's genetic status, it is not reaching beyond the bounds of reasonable
prognostication to see an analogous principle being applied to the rights of
impaired children born to society. This has already been done by a California
juvenile court. In the case of In re Phillip B., 147 court consent for life-saving
surgery was withheld from an eleven-year-old boy with Down's syndrome,
apparently for no other reason than to respect the parents' desire that the
child not outlive them.148 The trial judge, in explaining his order from the
144. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 14 (1930).
145. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 433, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979) (emphasis added).
146. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF GENERAL MEDICAL SCIENCES, WHAT ARE THE FACTS ABOUT
GENETIC DISEASE? 6 (1975).
147. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979).
148. Annas, The Case of Phillip Becker: A Legal Travesty, I NURSING LAW & ETHICS 4, 4 (1980). The
author of the cited article says this decision is based on "eugenic policy," "devalues human life in the name of
family autonomy," and treats the mentally retarded "little better than household pets." Id. at 4, 6.
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bench, dwelt at some length upon the emotional difficulties facing parents of a
genetically handicapped child. 49 This brings to mind the words of a leading
American bioethicist: "[I]t will be the soft-hearted rather than the hard-
hearted judges who will establish the doctrine of second class human
beings ....
C. Eugenic Abortion and Public Policy
In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,'5' parents sought to recover wrongful birth
damages for having been denied the opportunity to abort their congenitally
abnormal child. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied recovery, finding that
there was a public policy in New Jersey of protecting prenatal life which
outweighed the parents' interest in terminating that life.
We are not talking here about the breeding of prize cattle. It may have been easier
for the mother and less expensive for the father to have terminated the life of their
child while he was an embryo, but these alleged detriments cannot stand against
the preciousness of the single human life to support a remedy in tort .... We hold,
therefore, that the [claims of the parents] are not actionable because the conduct
complained of, even if true, does not give rise to damages cognizable at law; and
even if such alleged damages were cognizable, a claim for them would be pre-
cluded by the countervailing public policy supporting the preciousness of human
life. 15
2
Eleven years later, the same court concluded in Berman v. Allan'53 that
"[p]ublic policy now supports, rather than militates against, the proposition
that [a mother] not be impermissibly denied a meaningful opportunity to make
[the] decision [to abort her defective child]."'54
The Berman court cited no state legislation or legislative history, nor
discussed any social or economic changes to which it could attribute its
abandonment of the public policy "supporting the preciousness of human
life." What the court did cite was Mrs. Berman's constitutional right to
choose abortion, 155 established by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade. 56 Apparently, the court reasoned that the constitutional right to abor-
tion mandated a public policy of providing compensation when a woman is
denied the meaningful opportunity to decide to abort. That conclusion, how-
ever, is completely unfounded. While Roe v. Wade did establish that a state
may not interfere with a woman's right to choose abortion, it did not establish
that every woman has a right to receive any information that might be mean-
ingful to her in making the abortion decision. Whatever public policy Roe may
149. Id. at 6.
150. Kass, Implications of Prenatal Diagnosis for the Human Right to Life, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND
THE LAW 313, 318 (M. Humber & R. Almeder eds. 1976).
151. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
152. Id. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693.
153. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
154. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
155. Id. at 431, 404 A.2d at 14.
156. 410 U.S. 113 (1974).
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impose, it scarcely reaches as far as the Berman court supposed. Indeed,
more recent Supreme Court decisions 57 show that states are not prevented
from pursuing a policy of protecting prenatal life as long as state action does
not directly impinge on the woman's right to choose abortion. In Maher v.
Roe 58 the Court said, "There is a basic difference between direct state inter-
ference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative
activity consonant with legislative policy."' 59 Moreover, the Court has taken
several opportunities to reaffirm that a state's interest in protecting prenatal
life is "time-honored," "important," even "vital." '60
A reasonable interpretation of these cases would indicate that New
Jersey could, consonant with a policy of affirming the public mores concern-
ing the value of prenatal life, deny recovery in civil actions based upon a
diminished "meaningful opportunity" to abort, since the denial of recovery
would in no way interfere with or discourage a constitutionally protected
right. If the New Jersey Supreme Court had wished to look to sources of
public policy within the state, it needed to look no farther than to the state
legislature, which in 1975 passed a resolution calling for a constitutional
amendment that would protect the fetus's right to life from the moment of
conception. Instead, the court bypassed this clear proclamation of public
policy from the state's own legislative body, and erroneously concluded that
Roe v. Wade had set the only applicable policy on abortion for New Jersey.
This cavalier treatment of sensitive policy issues provides one more reason
why the recognition of a cause of action for the birth of a genetically impaired
child should be left to the legislature. Only a legislative body can give the
policy issues involved the full and fair discussion that they deserve.' 6'
VI. CONCLUSION
The issues presented in Becker and Berman are only the first of the many
vexing questions that will be posed in our legal forums as prenatal diagnosis
and genetic counseling become more common practices. This Comment has
attempted to show that the theory of liability for negligent prenatal diagnosis
contains new and unsettled issues, although it superficially shares similarities
with previous wrongful birth decisions. The problematic aspects of this cause
of action are apparent in that two courts considering identical allegations
reached diametrically opposite conclusions about what compensable injury
the plaintiff-parents suffered by the birth. This Comment advances two sug-
157. See Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977).
158. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
159. Id. at 475.
160. Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2686-88 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977).
161. -'[W]hen an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as those implicated [in abortion funding] ....




gestions for deriving just limits to the medical practitioner's liability when his
conduct leads to the birth of a genetically impaired child. First, if courts
recognize the cause of action at all, they should reject arguments that a lay
informed consent standard of care is appropriate in the context of prenatal
diagnosis. This standard would force practitioners to participate in parents'
pursuit of the perfect child to an unacceptable degree. The traditional mal-
practice standard of care is more appropriate, since liability should be predi-
cated upon a clear deviation from professionally accepted standards, and not
a conflict with the patient's personal predilections. Second, damages should
be limited to the tangible pecuniary expenses that the parents incur for the
special care of their child relating to the child's impairment. Any other
measure of damages would either exceed the true injury to the parents' legiti-
mate interests or be too speculative to permit a just determination. Finally,
the Comment urges that the recognition of this cause of action involves impor-
tant policy issues that courts cannot adequately treat through the judicial
process.
Dennis J. McCann
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